Using and Evaluating Adaptive Agents for Electronic Commerce Negotiation
IBERAMIA-SBIA '00 Proceedings of the International Joint Conference, 7th Ibero-American Conference on AI: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Determining Successful Negotiation Strategies: An Evolutionary Approach
ICMAS '98 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Multi Agent Systems
Non-Monotonic-Offers Bargaining Protocol
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Bargaining with incomplete information
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A Negotiation Meta Strategy Combining Trade-off and Concession Moves
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Predicting partner's behaviour in agent negotiation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Multi-issue negotiation protocol for agents: exploring nonlinear utility spaces
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
On monotonic mixed tactics and strategies for multi-issue negotiation
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Distributed learning of best response behaviors in concurrent iterated many-object negotiations
MATES'12 Proceedings of the 10th German conference on Multiagent System Technologies
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In automated bargaining a common method to obtain complex concession behaviour is to mix individual tactics, or decision functions, by a linear weighted combination. In such systems, the negotiation process between agents using mixed strategies with imitative and non-imitative tactics is highly dynamic, and non-monotonicity in the sequence of utilities of proposed offers can emerge at any time even in cases of individual cooperative behaviour and static strategy settings of both agents. This can result in a number of undesirable effects, such as delayed agreements, significant variation of outcomes with lower utilities, or a partial loss of control over the strategy settings. We propose two alternatives of mixing to avoid these problems, one based on individual imitative negotiation threads and one based on single concessions of each tactic involved. We prove that both produce monotonic sequences of utilities over time for mixed multi-tactic strategies with static and dynamically changing weights thereby avoiding such dynamic effects, and show with a comparative evaluation that they can provide utility gains for each agent in many multi-issue negotiation scenarios.