Policy invariance under reward transformations for general-sum stochastic games

  • Authors:
  • Xiaosong Lu;Howard M. Schwartz;Sidney N. Givigi

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Systems and Computer Engineering, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada;Department of Systems and Computer Engineering, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, ON, Canada

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We extend the potential-based shapingmethod fromMarkov decision processes to multiplayer general-sum stochastic games. We prove that the Nash equilibria in a stochastic game remains unchanged after potential-based shaping is applied to the environment. The property of policy invariance provides a possible way of speeding convergence when learning to play a stochastic game.