An idea bag strategy to discourage selfish behavior under random token MAC protocols for wireless LANs

  • Authors:
  • Jerzy Konorski

  • Affiliations:
  • Gdansk University of Technology, Gdansk, Poland

  • Venue:
  • ICDCN'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Networking
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Contention MAC protocols for a wireless LAN cannot count on selfish stations' adherence to the standard MAC. We consider anonymous stations in that a transmitted frame is only interpretable at the recipient(s). Two components of a MAC protocol are identified, a winner policy and a selection policy; by self-optimizing the latter, selfish stations can steal bandwidth from honest ones. We apply a game-theoretic framework to a protocol family called RT/ECD and design a repeated game strategy to discourage an invader ( a station selfishly deviating from that strategy. We require that (R1) if there is no invader, or if an invader retreats to honest behavior, then ultimately all stations are honest, and (R2) an invader ultimately obtain less bandwidth than it would if behaving honestly. The proposed strategy fulfills (R1), while fulfillment of (R2) is examined via Monte Carlo simulation of heuristic invader strategies.