Multiple access protocols: performance and analysis
Multiple access protocols: performance and analysis
Average Case Analysis of Algorithms on Sequences
Average Case Analysis of Algorithms on Sequences
Multiple Access in Ad-Hoc Wireless LANs with Noncooperative Stations
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DOMINO: a system to detect greedy behavior in IEEE 802.11 hotspots
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SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Game theory and the design of self-configuring, adaptive wireless networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
CSMA/CA performance under high traffic conditions: throughput and delay analysis
Computer Communications
Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Quality of service games in an IEEE 802.11 ad hoc wireless LAN
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Modeling analysis and simulation of wireless and mobile systems
Incentive compatible medium access control in wireless networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
ICDCN'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Networking
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The IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol is vulnerable to selfish backoff attacks exploiting the constituent CSMA/CA mechanism. Administrative prevention of such attacks fails in wireless ad-hoc LANs which cannot mandate stations’ behavior. We take a game-theoretic approach whereby stations are allowed to maximize their payoffs (success rates). Using a fairly accurate performance model we show that a noncooperative CSMA/CA game then arises with a payoff structure characteristic of a Prisoners’ Dilemma. For a repeated CSMA/CA game, a novel SPELL strategy is proposed. If the stations are rational players and wish to maximize a long-term utility, SPELL deters a single attacker by providing a disincentive to deviate from SPELL.