DOMINO: a system to detect greedy behavior in IEEE 802.11 hotspots
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Slotted Aloha as a game with partial information
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Solvability of a Markovian Model of an IEEE 802.11 LAN under a Backoff Attack
MASCOTS '05 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems
Energy-efficient power and rate control with QoS constraints: a game-theoretic approach
Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing
Playing CSMA/CA game to deter backoff attacks in ad hoc wireless LANs
ADHOC-NOW'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Ad-Hoc, Mobile, and Wireless Networks
Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Ad hoc networking with directional antennas: a complete system solution
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Congestion control mechanisms and the best effort service model
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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Wireless ad-hoc LANs employ CSMA/CA as part of the IEEE 802.11 DCF medium access protocol. This renders them vulnerable to selfish MAC-layer behavior consisting in self-configuring the minimum and maximum collision windows. Building on Bianchi's Markovian approximation we propose a refined model to calculate the resulting bandwidth distribution among the WLAN stations, and subsequently focus on a realistic scenario where a number of stations configure most selfishly, while the other stick to a standard configuration. Referring to some recent game-theoretic work on the CSMA/CA game we ask how the stations' QoS sensitivity affects the outcome of the game. One-shot and multistage QoS games are analyzed and preliminary insights are offered as to the existence and characterization of respective Nash equilibria.