A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Security in wireless sensor networks
Communications of the ACM - Wireless sensor networks
TinySec: a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks
SenSys '04 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
A performance evaluation of intrusion-tolerant routing in wireless sensor networks
IPSN'03 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Information processing in sensor networks
Fractal Merkle tree representation and traversal
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Public key cryptography in sensor networks—revisited
ESAS'04 Proceedings of the First European conference on Security in Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks
Designing secure sensor networks
IEEE Wireless Communications
Two-factor user authentication in wireless sensor networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
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Dealing with captured nodes is generally accepted as the most difficult challenge to wireless sensor network security. By utilizing the low-cost property of sensor nodes, we introduce the novel concept of one-time sensors to mitigate node-capture attacks. The basic idea is to load each sensor with only one cryptographic token so that the captured node can inject only a single malicious message into the network. In addition, sybil attacks are avoided and explicit revocation is not necessary using one-time sensors. By using public key techniques, one-way hash functions and Merkle’s hash tree, we also show efficient implementations and interesting tradeoffs for one-time sensors.