A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Montgomery's Multiplication Technique: How to Make It Smaller and Faster
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Data Integrity in Hardware for Modular Arithmetic
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Fault Attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete Results and Practical Countermeasures
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Design of fault-tolerant associative processors
ISCA '73 Proceedings of the 1st annual symposium on Computer architecture
Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
FPGA-Based Implementation of a Serial RSA Processor
DATE '03 Proceedings of the conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe - Volume 1
Permanent fault attack on the parameters of RSA with CRT
ACISP'03 Proceedings of the 8th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Hardware fault attack on RSA with CRT revisited
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
DSA Signature Scheme Immune to the Fault Cryptanalysis
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
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Most successful attacks against hardware implementations of cryptographic systems make use of side-channel information leakage. Recently, some attacks have been proposed against various cryptosystems, which exploit deliberate error injection during the computation process. Several error detection schemes have been proposed in order to counteract these attacks. In this paper, we add a residue-based error detection scheme to an RSA architecture and evaluate the area and latency overheads with respect to the basic architecture.