Barter: mechanism design for a market incented wisdom exchange

  • Authors:
  • Dawei Shen;Marshall Van Alstyne;Andrew Lippman;Hind Benbya

  • Affiliations:
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA;Boston University, Boston & Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA;Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA;Montpellier Business School, Montpellier, France

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the ACM 2012 conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Information markets benefit the communities they serve by facilitating electronic distributed exchange and enhancing knowledge sharing, innovation, and productivity. This research explores innovative market mechanisms to build incentives while encouraging pro-social behavior. A key advantage of this study is a direct appeal to theories of information economics and macro policies to market design. We built and deployed a web-based software platform called Barter at several universities. Preliminary analysis of user data helps test information market effectiveness and illustrate effects of various market interventions. We present our design framework, demonstrate why such an architecture provides sustainable incentives, and list key findings learned in the process of system deployment.