Domination on cocomparability graphs
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Algorithmic Aspects of the Core of Combinatorial Optimization Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
A Polynomial Algorithm for Recognizing Perfect Graphs
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Core Stability of Minimum Coloring Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Restricted Core Stability of Flow Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
CJCDGCGT'05 Proceedings of the 7th China-Japan conference on Discrete geometry, combinatorics and graph theory
Core stability of vertex cover games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Algorithms for core stability, core largeness, exactness, and extendability of flow games
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
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In cooperative game theory, a characterization of games with stable cores is known as one of the most notorious open problems. We study this problem for a special case of the minimum coloring games, introduced by Deng, Ibaraki & Nagamochi, which arises from a cost allocation problem when the players are involved in conflict. In this paper, we show that the minimum coloring game on a perfect graph has a stable core if and only if every vertex of the graph belongs to a maximum clique. We also consider the problem on the core largeness, the extendability, and the exactness of minimum coloring games.