Matrix multiplication via arithmetic progressions
Journal of Symbolic Computation - Special issue on computational algebraic complexity
Domination on cocomparability graphs
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Algorithmic Aspects of the Core of Combinatorial Optimization Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The complexity of theorem-proving procedures
STOC '71 Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Exact algorithms for NP-hard problems: a survey
Combinatorial optimization - Eureka, you shrink!
Combinatorica
Core stability of minimum coloring games
WG'04 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science
Fair cost allocations under conflicts - a game-theoretic point of view -
Discrete Optimization
On the cores of games arising from integer edge covering functions of graphs
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
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In cooperative game theory, a characterization of games with stable cores is known as one of the most notorious open problems. We study this problem for a special case of the minimum coloring games, introduced by Deng et al. (1999), which arise from a cost allocation problem when the players are involved in conflict. In this paper, we show that the minimum coloring game on a perfect graph has a stable core if and only if every vertex of the graph belongs to a maximum clique. We also consider the problem on the core largeness, the extendability, and the exactness of minimum coloring games. As a consequence, we show that it is coNP-complete to decide whether a given game has a large core, is extendable, or is exact.