On expected constant-round protocols for byzantine agreement

  • Authors:
  • Jonathan Katz;Chiu-Yuen Koo

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park;Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park

  • Venue:
  • CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

In a seminal paper, Feldman and Micali (STOC '88) show an n-party Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating t n/3 malicious parties that runs in expected constant rounds. Here, we show an expected constant-round protocol for authenticated Byzantine agreement assuming honest majority (i.e., t n/2), and relying only on the existence of a secure signature scheme and a public-key infrastructure (PKI). Combined with existing results, this gives the first expected constant-round protocol for secure computation with honest majority in a point-to-point network assuming only one-way functions and a PKI. Our key technical tool — a new primitive we introduce called moderated VSS — also yields a simpler proof of the Feldman-Micali result. We also show a simple technique for sequential composition of protocols without simultaneous termination (something that is inherent for Byzantine agreement protocols using o(n) rounds) for the case of tn/2.