Auctions and bidding with information

  • Authors:
  • John Debenham

  • Affiliations:
  • Faculty of Information Technology, University of Technology, Sydney, NSW, Australia

  • Venue:
  • AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

An approach to auctions and bidding is founded on observations and expectations of the opponents' behavior and not on assumptions concerning the opponents' motivations or internal reasoning. A bidding agent operates in an information-rich environment that includes real-time market data and data extracted from the World Wide Web. This agent employs maximum entropy inference to determine its actions on the basis of this uncertain data. Maximum entropy inference may be applied both to multi-issue and to single-issue negotiation. Multi-issue variants of the four common auction mechanisms are discussed.