ABYSS: An Architecture for Software Protection
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A software authentication system for information integrity
Computers and Security
Designing distributed applications with mobile code paradigms
ICSE '97 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Software engineering
The Java Language Specification
The Java Language Specification
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The Design and Analysis of Computer Algorithms
The Design and Analysis of Computer Algorithms
Computer
Do You Know What Your License Allows?
IEEE Software
IEEE Internet Computing
Mobile Code Paradigms and Technologies: A Case Study
MA '97 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Mobile Agents
Jada - Coordination and Communication for Java Agents
MOS '96 Selected Presentations and Invited Papers Second International Workshop on Mobile Object Systems - Towards the Programmable Internet
New security architectural directions for Java
COMPCON '97 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE International Computer Conference
Trusted distribution of software over the Internet
SNDSS '95 Proceedings of the 1995 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS'95)
PROTECTING EXTERNALLY SUPPLIED SOFTWARE IN SMALL COMPUTERS
PROTECTING EXTERNALLY SUPPLIED SOFTWARE IN SMALL COMPUTERS
Java security: from hotjava to netscape and beyond
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
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In this paper, a model for software authorization and protection in mobile code systems is proposed. In the model, a software is partitioned into objects, called mobile agents, and the privileges to access these agents are separated and distributed to the user's local system and a number of trusted servers called trusted computational proxies. The execution of a program (software) is conducted by cooperation of the agents and the proxies that contain them. Two agents are dependent if there is a message passing between them. To reduce the risk of software being attacked, dependent agents are distributed to different proxies. In this way, if a proxy is compromized, minimal information of the software will be disclosed. Methods for assigning agents to proxies are also proposed to minimize, under the security constraints, computation load of the proxies as well as communication load between the user's local system and proxies.