The analysis of algorithms
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Towards a theory of software protection
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Building a secure computer system
Building a secure computer system
Cryptography and data security
Cryptography and data security
CRYPTO '85 Advances in Cryptology
Message Authentication with Manipulation Detection Code
SP '83 Proceedings of the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Protecting Software Code by Guards
DRM '01 Revised Papers from the ACM CCS-8 Workshop on Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management
Architecture Support for 3D Obfuscation
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Embedded software security through key-based control flow obfuscation
InfoSecHiComNet'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Security aspects in information technology
Arc3D: a 3D obfuscation architecture
HiPEAC'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on High Performance Embedded Architectures and Compilers
Optimal assignment of mobile agents for software authorization and protection
Computer Communications
Adaptive defenses for commodity software through virtual application partitioning
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Trusted code execution in JavaCard
TrustBus'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business
TSV: A novel energy efficient Memory Integrity Verification scheme for embedded systems
Journal of Systems Architecture: the EUROMICRO Journal
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ABYSS (a basic Yorktown security system) is an architecture for protecting the execution of application software. It supports a uniform security service across the range of computing systems. The use of ABYSS in solving the software protection problem, especially in the lower end of the market, is discussed. Both current and planned software distribution channels are supportable by the architecture, and the system is nearly transparent to legitimate users. A novel use-once authorization mechanism, called a token, is introduced as a solution to the problem of providing authorizations without direct communication. Software vendors may use the system to obtain technical enforcement of virtually any terms and conditions of the sale of their software, including such things as rental software. Software may be transferred between systems, and backed up to guard against loss in case of failure. The problem of protecting software on these systems is discussed, and guidelines to its solution are offered.