A multi-agent prediction market based on partially observable stochastic game

  • Authors:
  • Janyl Jumadinova;Prithviraj Dasgupta

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE;University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We present a novel, game theoretic representation called POSGI (partially observable stochastic game with information) for distributed information aggregation using a multi-agent based prediction market model. We then describe a correlated equilibrium (CE)-based solution strategy for this game which enables each agent to dynamically calculate the prices at which it should trade a security in the prediction market. We have extended our results to risk averse traders and shown that a Pareto optimal correlated equilibrium strategy can be used to incentively truthful revelations from risk averse agents. Simulation results comparing our CE strategy with five other strategies commonly used in similar markets, with both risk neutral and risk averse agents, show that the CE strategy improves price predictions and provides higher utilities to the agents as compared to other existing strategies.