Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Combinatorial Information Market Design
Information Systems Frontiers
A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computation in a distributed information market
Theoretical Computer Science - Game theory meets theoretical computer science
A strategic model for information markets
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Second workshop on prediction markets
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Non-myopic strategies in prediction markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bluffing and strategic reticence in prediction markets
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Non-myopic strategies in prediction markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategies in Dynamic Pari-Mutual Markets
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Composition of markets with conflicting incentives
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Information aggregation in smooth markets
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
When do markets with simple agents fail?
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Partially observable stochastic game-based multi-agent prediction markets
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
A Multi-agent Prediction Market Based on Boolean Network Evolution
WI-IAT '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Rational market making with probabilistic knowledge
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Eliciting forecasts from self-interested experts: scoring rules for decision makers
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A multi-agent prediction market based on partially observable stochastic game
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
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One attractive feature of market scoring rules [Hanson, Information Systems Frontiers, 2003] is that they are myopically strategyproof: It is optimal for a trader to report her true belief about the likelihood of an event provided that we ignore the impact of her report on the profit she might garner from future trades. This does not rule out the possibility that traders may profit by first misleading other traders through dishonest trades and then correcting the errors made by other traders. In this paper, we describe a new approach to analyzing non-myopic strategies and the existence of myopic equilibria. We first use a simple model with two partially informed traders in a single information market to gain insight into the conditions under which different equilibrium behavior emerges. We prove that, under generic conditions, the myopically optimal strategy profile is not a weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) strategy for the logarithmic market scoring rule. We show that our results extend to multiple traders and signals. We propose a simple discounted market scoring rule that reduces the opportunity for bluffing strategies. We show that in any weak PBE, myopic or otherwise, the market price converges to the optimal price, and the rate of convergence can be bounded in terms of the discounting parameter.