Combinatorial Information Market Design
Information Systems Frontiers
Information incorporation in online in-Game sports betting markets
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The policy analysis market: an electronic commerce application of a combinatorial information market
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computer
Modeling information incorporation in markets, with application to detecting and explaining events
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Non-myopic strategies in prediction markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategies in Dynamic Pari-Mutual Markets
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Prediction markets, mechanism design, and cooperative game theory
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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Information markets, which are designed specifically to aggregate traders' information, are becoming increasingly popular as a means for predicting future events. Recent research in information markets has resulted in two new designs, market scoring rules and dynamic parimutuel markets. We develop an analytic method to guide the design and strategic analysis of information markets. Our central contribution is a new abstract betting game, the projection game, that serves as a useful model for information markets. We demonstrate that this game can serve as a strategic model of dynamic parimutuel markets, and also captures the essence of the strategies in market scoring rules. The projection game is tractable to analyze, and has an attractive geometric visualization that makes the strategic moves and interactions more transparent. We use it to prove several strategic properties about the dynamic parimutuel market. We also prove that a special form of the projection game is strategically equivalent to the spherical scoring rule, and it is strategically similar to other scoring rules. Finally, we illustrate two applications of the model to analysis of complex strategic scenarios: we analyze the precision of a market in which traders have inertia, and a market in which a trader can profit by manipulating another trader's beliefs.