Combinatorial Information Market Design
Information Systems Frontiers
A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Elicitation of Probabilities Using Competitive Scoring Rules
Decision Analysis
Computation in a distributed information market
Theoretical Computer Science - Game theory meets theoretical computer science
A strategic model for information markets
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of combinatorial market makers
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Betting Boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Eliciting forecasts from self-interested experts: scoring rules for decision makers
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive compatibility considerations are commonly studied in mechanism design. While this relation between prediction markets and mechanism design is well understood at a high level, the models used in prediction markets tend to be somewhat different from those used in mechanism design. This paper considers a model for prediction markets that fits more straightforwardly into the mechanism design framework. We consider a number of mechanisms within this model, all based on proper scoring rules. We discuss basic properties of these mechanisms, such as incentive compatibility. We also draw connections between some of these mechanisms and cooperative game theory. Finally, we speculate how one might build a practical prediction market based on some of these ideas.