Combinatorial Information Market Design
Information Systems Frontiers
Elicitation of Probabilities Using Competitive Scoring Rules
Decision Analysis
Betting Boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulas
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Eliciting properties of probability distributions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Parimutuel Kelly Probability Scoring Rule
Decision Analysis
Bluffing and strategic reticence in prediction markets
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Pari-mutuel markets: mechanisms and performance
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Computational challenges in e-commerce
Communications of the ACM - Rural engineering development
Collective revelation: a mechanism for self-verified, weighted, and truthful predictions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Subsidized Prediction Markets for Risk Averse Traders
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Prediction markets, mechanism design, and cooperative game theory
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
When do markets with simple agents fail?
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Information, Divergence and Risk for Binary Experiments
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
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We examine a class of wagering mechanisms designed to elicit truthful predictions from a group of people without requiring any outside subsidy. We propose a number of desirable properties for wagering mechanisms, identifying one mechanism - weighted-score wagering - that satisfies all of the properties. Moreover, we show that a single-parameter generalization of weighted-score wagering is the only mechanism that satisfies these properties. We explore some variants of the core mechanism based on practical considerations.