Combinatorial Information Market Design
Information Systems Frontiers
Convex Optimization
Eliciting properties of probability distributions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Non-myopic strategies in prediction markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A unified framework for dynamic pari-mutuel information market design
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Bluffing and strategic reticence in prediction markets
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
IEEE Spectrum
Information elicitation for decision making
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Decision markets with good incentives
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study information revelation in scoring rule and prediction market mechanisms in settings in which traders have conflicting incentives due to opportunities to profit from the market operator's subsequent actions. In our canonical model, an agent Alice is offered an incentive-compatible scoring rule to reveal her beliefs about a future event, but can also profit from misleading another trader Bob about her information and then making money off Bob's error in a subsequent market. We show that, in any weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this sequence of two markets, Alice and Bob earn payoffs that are consistent with a minimax strategy of a related game. We can then characterize the equilibria in terms of an information channel: the outcome of the first scoring rule is as if Alice had only observed a noisy version of her initial signal, with the degree of noise indicating the adverse effect of the second market on the first. We provide a partial constructive characterization of when this channel will be noiseless. We show that our results on the canonical model yield insights into other settings of information extraction with conflicting incentives.