Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Regret based dynamics: convergence in weakly acyclic games
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
A tutorial on the dynamics and control of wind turbines and wind farms
ACC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 conference on American Control Conference
Cooperative control and potential games
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
An architectural view of game theoretic control
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
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There is a growing interest in the application of game theoretic methods to the design and control of multiagent systems. However, the existing game theoretic framework possesses inherent limitations with regards to these new prescriptive challenges. In this paper we propose a new framework, termed state based potential games, which introduces an underlying state space into the framework of potential games. This state space provides a system designer with an additional degree of freedom to help coordinate group behavior and overcome these limitations. Within the context of state based potential games, we characterize the limiting behavior of two learning algorithms termed finite memory better reply processes and log-linear learning. Lastly, we demonstrate the applicability of state based potential games on two cooperative control problems pertaining to distributed resource allocation and the design of local and distributed control laws.