Unconditional security in quantum cryptography
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Quantum Cryptography with Imperfect Apparatus
FOCS '98 Proceedings of the 39th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Quantum cryptography in practice
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
Quantum Information & Computation
Information vs. disturbance in dimension D
Quantum Information & Computation
The universal composable security of quantum key distribution
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Attacks on fixed apparatus quantum key distribution schemes
TPNC'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Theory and Practice of Natural Computing
Attacks on fixed apparatus quantum key distribution schemes
TPNC'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Theory and Practice of Natural Computing
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Photonic quantum key distribution (QKD) is commonly implemented using interferometers, devices that inherently cause the addition of vacuum ancillas, thus enlarging the quantum space in use. This enlargement sometimes exposes the implemented protocol to new kinds of attacks that have not yet been analyzed. We consider several QKD implementations that use interferometers, and analyze the enlargement of the quantum space caused by the interferometers. While we show that some interferometric implementations are robust (against simple attacks), our main finding is that several other implementations used in QKD experiments are totally insecure. This result is somewhat surprising since although we assume ideal devices and an underlying protocol which is proven secure (e.g., the Bennett-Brassard QKD), the realization is insecure. Our novel attack demonstrates the risks of using practical realizations without performing an extensive security analysis of the specific setup in use.