The universal composable security of quantum key distribution

  • Authors:
  • Michael Ben-Or;Michał Horodecki;Debbie W. Leung;Dominic Mayers;Jonathan Oppenheim

  • Affiliations:
  • ,Institute of Computer Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel;,Institute of Theoretical Physics and Astrophysics, University of Gdańsk, Poland;,Institute of Quantum Information, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena;,Institute of Quantum Information, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena;,Institute of Computer Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

  • Venue:
  • TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

The existing unconditional security definitions of quantum key distribution (QKD) do not apply to joint attacks over QKD and the subsequent use of the resulting key. In this paper, we close this potential security gap by using a universal composability theorem for the quantum setting. We first derive a composable security definition for QKD. We then prove that the usual security definition of QKD still implies the composable security definition. Thus, a key produced in any QKD protocol that is unconditionally secure in the usual definition can indeed be safely used, a property of QKD that is hitherto unproven. We propose two other useful sufficient conditions for composability. As a simple application of our result, we show that keys generated by repeated runs of QKD degrade slowly.