A proof of the security of quantum key distribution (extended abstract)
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Quantum Key Distribution and String Oblivious Transfer in Noisy Channels
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proof of unconditional security of six-state quatum key distribution scheme
Quantum Information & Computation
Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
Quantum Information & Computation
Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems
Quantum Information & Computation
The universal composable security of quantum key distribution
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Universally composable privacy amplification against quantum adversaries
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Proof of security of quantum key distribution with two-way classical communications
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws
Quantum Information & Computation
Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
Quantum Information & Computation
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the key information is encoded in the relative phase of a coherent-state reference pulse and a weak coherent-state signal pulse, as in some practical implementations of the protocol. In contrast to previous work, our proof applies even if the eavesdropper knows the phase of the reference pulse, provided that this phase is not modulated by the source, and even if the reference pulse is bright. The proof also applies to the case where the key is encoded in the photon polarization of a weak coherent-state pulse with a known phase, but only if the phases of the four BB84 signal states are judiciously chosen. The achievable key generation rate scales quadratically with the transmission in the channel, just as for BB84 with phase-randomized weak coherent-state signals (when decoy states are not used). For the case where the phase of the reference pulse is strongly modulated by the source, we exhibit an explicit attack that allows the eavesdropper to learn every key bit in a parameter regime where a protocol using phase-randomized signals is provably secure.