Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws

Authors:
Lars Lydersen;Johannes Skaar
Affiliations:
Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway and University Graduate Center, Kjeller, Norway;Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway and University Graduate Center, Kjeller, Norway
Venue:
Quantum Information & Computation
Year:
2010

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Abstract

We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for QuantumKey Distribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. Wesuggest a powerful attack that can be used in systems with detector efficiency mismatch,even if the detector assignments are chosen randomly by Bob. A security proof is pro-vided, valid for any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in thechannel/receiver/detectors. The proof does not assume the so-called squashing detectormodel.