Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols

Authors:
V. Makarov;J. Skaar
Affiliations:
Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Norwegian Univ. of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway and Radiophysics Dept., St. Petersburg State Polytechnic Univ., St. Petersburg, Russi ...;Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
Venue:
Quantum Information & Computation
Year:
2008

Citing 3
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Abstract

In quantum cryptosystems, variations in detector efficiency can be exploited to stage a successful attack. This happens when the efficiencies of Bob's two detectors are different functions of a control parameter accessible to Eve (e.g., timing of the incoming pulses). It has previously been shown that the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is vulnerable to this attack. In this paper, we show that several other protocols and encodings may also be vulnerable. We consider a faked states attack in the case of a partial efficiency mismatch on the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol, and derive the quantum bit error rate as a function of detector efficiencies. Additionally, it is shown how faked states can in principle be constructed for quantum cryptosystems that use a phase-time encoding, the differential phase shift keying (DPSK) and the Ekert protocols.