Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices

  • Authors:

  • Daniel Gottesman;Hoi-Kwong Lo;Norbert Lütkenhaus;John Preskill

  • Affiliations:

  • Perimeter Institute, Waterloo, ON, Canada;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Department of Physics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada;Institute of Theoretical Physics and Max Planck Research Group, Institute of Optics, Information, and Photonics, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany;Institute for Quantum Information, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA

  • Venue:
  • Quantum Information & Computation
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.