Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems

Authors:
Bing Qi;Chi-Hang Fred Fung;Hoi-Kwong Lo;Xiongfeng Ma
Affiliations:
Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control (CQIQC), Dept. of Physics and Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada;Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control (CQIQC), Dept. of Physics and Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada;Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control (CQIQC), Dept. of Physics and Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada;Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control (CQIQC), Dept. of Physics and Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Venue:
Quantum Information & Computation
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Recently, a new type of attack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors (SPD) in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, has been proposed. In this paper, we propose another "time-shift" attack that exploits the same imperfection. In our attack, Eve shifts the arrival time of either the signal pulse or the synchronization pulse or both between Alice and Bob. In particular, in a QKD system where Bob employs time-multiplexing technique to detect both bit "0" and bit "1" with the same SPD, Eve, in some circumstances, could acquire full information on the final key without introducing any error. In addition, we prove that if Alice and Bob are unaware of our attack, the final key they share is insecure. We emphasize that our attack is simple and feasible with current technology. Finally, we discuss some counter measures against our and earlier attacks.