Universal Hashing and Authentication Codes
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Quantum Key Distribution Scheme and a Proof of Its Unconditional Security
Journal of Cryptology
The operational meaning of min- and max-entropy
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Security of quantum key distribution with bit and basis dependent detector flaws
Quantum Information & Computation
Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
Quantum Information & Computation
Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
Quantum Information & Computation
Generalized privacy amplification
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory - Part 2
Security Aspects of the Authentication Used in Quantum Cryptography
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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Partial information leakages of generation key undoubtedly influence the security of practical Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system. In this paper, based on finite-key analysis and deep investigation on privacy amplification, we present a method for characterizing information leakages gained by adversary in each authentication round and therefore take the theory derived by Cederlöf and Larsson (IEEE Trans Inf Theory 54:1735---1741, 2008) into practical case. As the authentication key is fed from one round of generation keys to the next except the first round, by considering its security weakness due to information leakages and finite size effect, we further propose a universal formula for calculating the lifetime of initial authentication key used in QKD with finite resources. Numerical simulations indicate that our bound for estimating information leakages strictly characterizes the stability of practical QKD against information-leakage-based attacks, and our calculation formula in terms of lifetime can precisely evaluate the usage time of initial authentication key. Our work provides a practical solution for evaluating authentication security of QKD.