N-Gram against the machine: on the feasibility of the n-gram network analysis for binary protocols

  • Authors:
  • Dina Hadžiosmanović;Lorenzo Simionato;Damiano Bolzoni;Emmanuele Zambon;Sandro Etalle

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Twente, The Netherlands;Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy;University of Twente, The Netherlands;University of Twente, The Netherlands;University of Twente, The Netherlandechnical University of Eindhoven, The Netherlands

  • Venue:
  • RAID'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In recent years we have witnessed several complex and high-impact attacks specifically targeting "binary" protocols (RPC, Samba and, more recently, RDP). These attacks could not be detected by current --- signature-based --- detection solutions, while --- at least in theory --- they could be detected by state-of-the-art anomaly-based systems. This raises once again the still unanswered question of how effective anomaly-based systems are in practice. To contribute to answering this question, in this paper we investigate the effectiveness of a widely studied category of network intrusion detection systems: anomaly-based algorithms using n-gram analysis for payload inspection. Specifically, we present a thorough analysis and evaluation of several detection algorithms using variants of n-gram analysis on real-life environments. Our tests show that the analyzed systems, in presence of data with high variability, cannot deliver high detection and low false positive rates at the same time.