Polymorphic blending attacks

  • Authors:
  • Prahlad Fogla;Monirul Sharif;Roberto Perdisci;Oleg Kolesnikov;Wenke Lee

  • Affiliations:
  • Georgia Institute of Technology;Georgia Institute of Technology;Georgia Institute of Technology;Georgia Institute of Technology;Georgia Institute of Technology

  • Venue:
  • USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

A very effective means to evade signature-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) is to employ polymorphic techniques to generate attack instances that do not share a fixed signature. Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems provide good defense because existing polymorphic techniques can make the attack instances look different from each other, but cannot make them look like normal. In this paper we introduce a new class of polymorphic attacks, called polymorphic blending attacks, that can effectively evade byte frequency-based network anomaly IDS by carefully matching the statistics of the mutated attack instances to the normal profiles. The proposed polymorphic blending attacks can be viewed as a subclass of the mimicry attacks. We take a systematic approach to the problem and formally describe the algorithms and steps required to carry out such attacks. We not only show that such attacks are feasible but also analyze the hardness of evasion under different circumstances. We present detailed techniques using PAYL, a byte frequency-based anomaly IDS, as a case study and demonstrate that these attacks are indeed feasible. We also provide some insight into possible countermeasures that can be used as defense.