Silicon physical random functions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Toward an automated verification of certificates of authenticity
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Certifying authenticity via fiber-infused paper
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Introduction to Modern Cryptography (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series)
Introduction to Modern Cryptography (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series)
FPGA Intrinsic PUFs and Their Use for IP Protection
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Anti-counterfeiting with a Random Pattern
SECURWARE '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Second International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies
Memory Leakage-Resilient Encryption Based on Physically Unclonable Functions
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Countering Counterfeit Trade: Illicit Market Insights, Best-Practice Strategies, and Management Toolbox
Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
A Formalization of the Security Features of Physical Functions
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Read-proof hardware from protective coatings
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
RFID-Tags for anti-counterfeiting
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Robust key extraction from physical uncloneable functions
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Strong PUFs and their (physical) unpredictability: a case study with power PUFs
Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
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Physically Unclonable Functions are a promising tool to protect against counterfeiting attacks. Yet, as with any security system, it is important to embed them in a sound protocol, ensuring that no unexpected weakness is present in the "mortar" binding the components together. This paper proposes an anti-counterfeiting protocol that provably reduces to natural properties of its underlying components, namely an image-based Physical Function System bearing physical unclonability and an existentially unforgeable signature scheme. Experiments confirm the practical feasibility of our construction.