Physically uncloneable functions in the universal composition framework
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Recyclable PUFs: logically reconfigurable PUFs
CHES'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Can EDA combat the rise of electronic counterfeiting?
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
EDA for secure and dependable cybercars: challenges and opportunities
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
A formal definition and a new security mechanism of physical unclonable functions
MMB'12/DFT'12 Proceedings of the 16th international GI/ITG conference on Measurement, Modelling, and Evaluation of Computing Systems and Dependability and Fault Tolerance
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Security analysis of image-based PUFs for anti-counterfeiting
CMS'12 Proceedings of the 13th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
ClockPUF: physical unclonable functions based on clock networks
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Memristor PUFs: a new generation of memory-based physically unclonable functions
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
Bias-based modeling and entropy analysis of PUFs
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Trustworthy embedded devices
Strong PUFs and their (physical) unpredictability: a case study with power PUFs
Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems Security
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Trustworthy embedded devices
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Physical attacks against cryptographic devices typically take advantage of information leakage (e.g., side-channels attacks) or erroneous computations (e.g., fault injection attacks). Preventing or detecting these attacks has become a challenging task in modern cryptographic research. In this context intrinsic physical properties of integrated circuits, such as Physical(ly) Unclonable Functions~(PUFs), can be used to complement classical cryptographic constructions, and to enhance the security of cryptographic devices. PUFs have recently been proposed for various applications, including anti-counterfeiting schemes, key generation algorithms, and in the design of block ciphers. However, currently only rudimentary security models for PUFs exist, limiting the confidence in the security claims of PUF-based security primitives. A useful model should at the same time (i) define the security properties of PUFs abstractly and naturally, allowing to design and formally analyze PUF-based security solutions, and (ii) provide practical quantification tools allowing engineers to evaluate PUF instantiations. In this paper, we present a formal foundation for security primitives based on PUFs. Our approach requires as little as possible from the physics and focuses more on the main properties at the heart of most published works on PUFs: robustness (generation of stable answers), unclonability (not provided by algorithmic solutions), and unpredictability. We first formally define these properties and then show that they can be achieved by previously introduced PUF instantiations. We stress that such a consolidating work allows for a meaningful security analysis of security primitives taking advantage of physical properties, becoming increasingly important in the development of the next generation secure information systems.