The memory fragmentation problem: solved?
Proceedings of the 1st international symposium on Memory management
Composing high-performance memory allocators
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2001 conference on Programming language design and implementation
CCured: type-safe retrofitting of legacy code
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Region-based memory management in cyclone
PLDI '02 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2002 Conference on Programming language design and implementation
Ensuring code safety without runtime checks for real-time control systems
CASES '02 Proceedings of the 2002 international conference on Compilers, architecture, and synthesis for embedded systems
Reconsidering custom memory allocation
OOPSLA '02 Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGPLAN conference on Object-oriented programming, systems, languages, and applications
ATEC '02 Proceedings of the General Track of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Secure Execution via Program Shepherding
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Memory safety without runtime checks or garbage collection
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Language, compiler, and tool for embedded systems
PLDI '03 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2003 conference on Programming language design and implementation
Protecting C programs from attacks via invalid pointer dereferences
Proceedings of the 9th European software engineering conference held jointly with 11th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Shellcoder's Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes
The Shellcoder's Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes
An efficient and backwards-compatible transformation to ensure memory safety of C programs
Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGSOFT twelfth international symposium on Foundations of software engineering
On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Run-time Detection of Heap-based Overflows
LISA '03 Proceedings of the 17th USENIX conference on System administration
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
DieHard: probabilistic memory safety for unsafe languages
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
PointguardTM: protecting pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Address obfuscation: an efficient approach to combat a board range of memory error exploits
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
TIED, LibsafePlus: tools for runtime buffer overflow protection
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Where's the FEEB? the effectiveness of instruction set randomization
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Transparent run-time defense against stack smashing attacks
ATEC '00 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
IEEE Software
Efficient protection against heap-based buffer overflows without resorting to magic
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Runtime countermeasures for code injection attacks against C and C++ programs
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Memory managers are an important part of modern language and are used to dynamically allocate memory. Many managers exist; however, two major types can be identified: manual memory allocators and garbage collectors. In the case of manual memory allocators, the programmer must manually release memory back to the system when it is no longer needed. Problems can occur when a programmer forgets to release it, releases it twice or uses freed memory. These problems are solved in garbage collectors. However, both manual memory allocators and garbage collectors store management information. This paper describes several vulnerabilities for C and C++ and how these could be remedied by modifying the management information of a representative manual memory allocator and garbage collector. Additionally, the authors present an approach that, when applied to memory managers, will protect against these attack vectors.