Efficient detection of all pointer and array access errors
PLDI '94 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1994 conference on Programming language design and implementation
LCLint: a tool for using specifications to check code
SIGSOFT '94 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGSOFT symposium on Foundations of software engineering
Introduction to algorithms
Type-Assisted Dynamic Buffer Overflow Detection
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
CSSV: towards a realistic tool for statically detecting all buffer overflows in C
PLDI '03 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2003 conference on Programming language design and implementation
Statically detecting likely buffer overflow vulnerabilities
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
PointguardTM: protecting pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Transparent run-time defense against stack smashing attacks
ATEC '00 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
An efficient and backwards-compatible transformation to ensure memory safety of C programs
Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGSOFT twelfth international symposium on Foundations of software engineering
Randomized instruction set emulation
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Enhancing security through hardware-assisted run-time validation of program data properties
CODES+ISSS '05 Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE/ACM/IFIP international conference on Hardware/software codesign and system synthesis
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Architectural support for run-time validation of program data properties
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
FormatShield: A Binary Rewriting Defense against Format String Attacks
ACISP '08 Proceedings of the 13th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
Control-flow integrity principles, implementations, and applications
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cruiser: concurrent heap buffer overflow monitoring using lock-free data structures
Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
WOOT'11 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
RIPE: runtime intrusion prevention evaluator
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Transparent run-time prevention of format-string attacks via dynamic taint and flexible validation
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Efficient protection against heap-based buffer overflows without resorting to magic
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Improving Memory Management Security for C and C++
International Journal of Secure Software Engineering
Control-flow integrity principles, implementations, and applications
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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Buffer overflow exploits make use of the treatment of strings in C as character arrays rather than as first-class objects. Manipulation of arrays as pointers and primitive pointer arithmetic make it possible for a program to access memory locations which it is not supposed to access. There have been many efforts in the past to overcome this vulnerability by performing array bounds checking in C. Most of these solutions are either inadequate, inefficient or incompatible with legacy code. In this paper, we present an efficient and transparent runtime approach for protection against all known forms of buffer overflow attacks. Our solution consists of two tools: TIED (Type Information Extractor and Depositor) and LibsafePlus. TIED extracts size information of all global and automatic buffers defined in the program from the debugging information produced by the compiler and inserts it back in the program binary as a data structure available at runtime. LibsafePlus is a dynamic library which provides wrapper functions for unsafe C library functions such as strcpy. These wrapper functions check the source and target buffer sizes using the information made available by TIED and perform the requested operation only when it is safe to do so. For dynamically allocated buffers, the sizes and starting addresses are recorded at runtime. With our simple design we are able to protect most applications with a performance overhead of less than 10%.