Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing

  • Authors:
  • William J. Rapaport

  • Affiliations:
  • University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, USA

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this reply to James H. Fetzer's "Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action", the author argues that computationalism should not be the view that human cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition simpliciter is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if human cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. The author also argues that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, the author suggests that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, the author takes issue with Fetzer's arguments to the contrary.