Using representative strategies for finding nash equilibria

  • Authors:
  • Chih-Yuan Chou;Tian-Li Yu

  • Affiliations:
  • National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan Roc;National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan Roc

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 15th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

Since the existence of at least one mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) for any game was proved by Nash, finding NE has been an important issue in the field of game theory. However, polynomial-time algorithms for such task have not yet been discovered, and one of the difficulties is the infinite search space. In this paper, we define the so-called ε-representative strategy to reduce the search space. In general, the equilibria on these representative strategies are not the original equilibria but approximations.To find such approximate equilibria, we then propose a two-level method, which firstly uses co-evolutionary algorithms to co-evolve the representative strategies for each player and then the approximate equilibria.The computational time can be controlled by the parameters of the co-evolutionary algorithms. Empirical results show that our method finds the approximate NE in a reasonable time. Finally, the definitions developed in this paper help define the co-evolvability of NE.