An evaluation of an AES implementation protected against EM analysis

Authors:
Paolo Maistri;Sebastien Tiran;Philippe Maurine;Israel Koren;Régis Leveugle
Affiliations:
TIMA Laboratory, Grenoble, France;LIRMM, Montpellier, France;LIRMM, Montpellier, France;University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA;TIMA Laboratory, Grenoble, France
Venue:
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM international conference on Great lakes symposium on VLSI
Year:
2013

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Abstract

EM emissions can be a rich source of leakage for side-channel analysis of cipher implementations. In this paper, we describe a set of novel countermeasures based on dynamic spatial relocation and dynamic mappings, and validate the protection provided by them against EM attacks. The countermeasures improve significantly the security of the circuit.