Bounded Rationality in Service Systems

  • Authors:
  • Tingliang Huang;Gad Allon;Achal Bassamboo

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Management Science and Innovation, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom;Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208;Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208

  • Venue:
  • Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

The traditional operations management and queueing literature typically assumes that customers are fully rational. In contrast, in this paper we study canonical service models with boundedly rational customers. We capture bounded rationality using a model in which customers are incapable of accurately estimating their expected waiting time. We investigate the impact of bounded rationality from both a profit-maximizing firm's perspective and a social planner's perspective. For visible queues with the optimal price, bounded rationality results in revenue and welfare loss; with a fixed price, bounded rationality can lead to strict social welfare improvement. For invisible queues, bounded rationality benefits the firm when its level is sufficiently high. Ignoring bounded rationality, when present yet small, can result in significant revenue and welfare loss.