Pricing computer services: queueing effects
Communications of the ACM
An Incentive Compatible Flow Control Algorithm for Rate Allocation in Computer Networks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Optimal incentive-compatible priority pricing for the M/M/1 queue
Operations Research
User delay costs and internal pricing for a service facility
Management Science
Multiclass queueing systems: polymatroidal structure and optimal scheduling control
Operations Research - Supplement to Operations Research: stochastic processes
Information Technology and Time-Based Competition in Financial Markets
Management Science
Dynamic Pricing for Network Service: Equilibrium and Stability
Management Science
Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Optimal Pricing of Priority Services
Operations Research
Pricing congestible network resources
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A mechanism for pricing and resource allocation in peer-to-peer networks
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Bounded Rationality in Service Systems
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Incentive-Compatible Revenue Management in Queueing Systems: Optimal Strategic Delay
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
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This paper proposes a resource allocation and pricing mechanism for a service system that serves multiple classes of jobs within an organization. Each class of service request is subject to a class-dependent quality of service (QoS) guarantee on the expected delay bound, which may be imposed by business rules in an organization or other application-specific technical constraints. We develop an extension of a resource allocation and pricing mechanism for an M/M/1 system. In contrast to the system without the QoS guarantee, where a fixed priority scheduling policy---known as the cμ rule---is optimal, we show that the system may need to adopt a more general randomized priority scheduling policy to maximize the overall system profit. We also develop a transfer pricing scheme that is both optimal and incentive compatible, allowing users to act in their self-interests while collectively achieving the system optimum. We show that the pricing scheme with the QoS guarantee depends on the scheduling policy implemented and has different characteristics from that without the QoS guarantee.