Infranet: Circumventing Web Censorship and Surveillance
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
ConceptDoppler: a weather tracker for internet censorship
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Information Revolution and Global Politics)
Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace
Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace
Chipping away at censorship firewalls with user-generated content
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Telex: anticensorship in the network infrastructure
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Ignoring the great firewall of china
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
StegoTorus: a camouflage proxy for the Tor anonymity system
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Free and open access to information on the Internet is at risk: more than 60 countries around the world practice some form of Internet censorship, and both the number of countries practicing censorship and the proportion of Internet users who are subject to it are likely to increase. We posit that, although it may not always be feasible to guarantee free and open access to information, citizens have the right to know when their access has been obstructed, restricted, or tampered with, so that they can make informed decisions on information access. We motivate the need for a system that provides accurate, verifiable reports of censorship and discuss the challenges involved in designing such a system. We place these challenges in context by studying their applicability to OONI, a new censorship measurement platform.