Implementing fault-tolerant services using the state machine approach: a tutorial
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
A Secure Group Membership Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Error-detecting codes and fault-containing self-stabilization
Information Processing Letters
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Fail-stop processors: an approach to designing fault-tolerant computing systems
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Communications of the ACM
Time, clocks, and the ordering of events in a distributed system
Communications of the ACM
On the minimum node degree and connectivity of a wireless multihop network
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure and Efficient Asynchronous Broadcast Protocols
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An asynchronous [(n - 1)/3]-resilient consensus protocol
PODC '84 Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secrecy, authentication, and public key systems.
Secrecy, authentication, and public key systems.
Efficient self-healing group key distribution with revocation capability
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
URSA: ubiquitous and robust access control for mobile ad hoc networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
On the Distribution and Revocation of Cryptographic Keys in Sensor Networks
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
An Efficient Key Revocation Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks
WOWMOM '06 Proceedings of the 2006 International Symposium on on World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks
Suicide for the common good: a new strategy for credential revocation in self-organizing systems
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Elliptic curve cryptography-based access control in sensor networks
International Journal of Security and Networks
Cooperative security in distributed sensor networks
COLCOM '07 Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing
New strategies for revocation in ad-hoc networks
ESAS'07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Security and privacy in ad-hoc and sensor networks
Brief announcement: distributed trust management and revocation
Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Identity-Based access control for ad hoc groups
ICISC'04 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Security in wireless sensor networks: considerations and experiments
SAMOS'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Embedded Computer Systems: architectures, Modeling, and Simulation
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We consider a distributed network in which faulty nodes can pose serious threats as they can subvert the correct operation of basic functionalities, such as, routing or data aggregation. As a setoff to such nodes, we suggest that trust management between nodes is an essential part of a distributed system. In particular, benign nodes shall communicate with trusted nodes only and misbehaving nodes must be rapidly removed from the system. This paper formalizes the concept and properties of cooperative security - a protocol which allows implementing trust management by means of two voting procedures. During the first voting - admission procedure - each node gains trust by distributing revocation information to its neighbors. These neighbors form the node's trusted entourage. If the node cooperates and discloses enough information, it is admitted and can communicate with the rest of the network; otherwise it is rejected. If the admitted node tries to endanger the network the second revocation voting procedure takes place. In this case, if the node's entourage agrees upon act of misbehavior they revoke the node network-wide using previously disclosed revocation information.