The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More
The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More
Understanding user behavior in large-scale video-on-demand systems
Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2006
Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement
CoNEXT '07 Proceedings of the 2007 ACM CoNEXT conference
Interconnecting eyeballs to content: a shapley value perspective on isp peering and settlement
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
On cooperative settlement between content, transit and eyeball internet service providers
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Efficient computation of the shapley value for centrality in networks
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
ICQT'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet charging and QoS technologies: economics of converged, internet-based networks
A service plane over the PCE architecture for automatic multidomain connection-oriented services
IEEE Communications Magazine
On the problem of revenue sharing in multi-domain federations
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
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Although video-on-demand (VoD) services are provided by many ISPs, the amount of content provided by each VoD service is one order smaller than that provided by rental video services, so the limited content count is one of the obstacles to widespread VoD services. To solve this problem, ISPs can form a coalition with other ISPs and use content owned by other ISPs. However, to form a coalition among multiple ISPs, ISPs need to rationally allocate the profit obtained by the coalition to convince all ISPs participating in the coalition. We propose using the Shapley value of the coalitional game as the rational allocation of profit. Assuming that all but one ISP has the same number of users or (and) the same number of rare content, we derive the Shapley value in closed form and clarify the influence of the numbers of users and rare content on the coalition. We also compare the Shapley value with three general allocation models and show that the Shapley value agrees with the allocation when the profit obtained by each content delivery is equally shared by two ISPs, one that accommodates the receiving user and the other that owns the delivered content.