Information Technology and Management
Dynamic Portfolio Selection of NPD Programs Using Marginal Returns
Management Science
A decision support model for optimal timing of investments in information technology upgrades
Decision Support Systems
Technology roles and paths of influence in an ecosystem model of technology evolution
Information Technology and Management
The game of scale: decision making with economies of scale
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Adoption of new online services in the presence of network externalities and complementarities
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
A cost-based multi-unit resource auction for service-oriented grid computing
GRID '07 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Computing
Vision labs: seeing UCD as a relational practice
Proceedings of the 20th Australasian Conference on Computer-Human Interaction: Designing for Habitus and Habitat
Coping with Uncertainties in Technological Learning
Management Science
An Agent-Based Simulation of Smart Metering Technology Adoption
International Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems
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We present an evolutionary model of technology diffusion in which an old and a new technology are available, both of which improve their performance incrementally over time. Technology adopters make repeated choices between the established and the new technology based on their perceived performance, which is subject to uncertainty. Both technologies exhibit positive externalities, or performance benefits from others using the same technology. We find that the superior technology will not necessarily be broadly adopted by the population. Externalities cause two stable usage equilibria to exist, one with the old technology being the standard and the other with the new technology the standard. Punctuations, or sudden shifts, in these equilibria determine the patterns of technology diffusion. The time for an equilibrium punctuation depends on the rate of incremental improvement of both technologies, and on the system's resistance to switching between equilibria. If the new technology has a higher rate of incremental improvement, it is adopted faster, and adoption may precede performance parity if the system's resistance to switching is low. Adoption of the new technology may trail performance parity if the system's resistance to switching is high.