Single-packet IP traceback

  • Authors:
  • Alex C. Snoeren;Craig Partridge;Luis A. Sanchez;Christine E. Jones;Fabrice Tchakountio;Beverly Schwartz;Stephen T. Kent;W. Timothy Strayer

  • Affiliations:
  • IEEE and MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA and BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA;IEEE and BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA;Megisto Systems, Inc., Germantown, MD;BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA;IEEE and BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA;BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA;BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA;IEEE and BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA

  • Venue:
  • IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
  • Year:
  • 2002

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.02

Visualization

Abstract

The design of the IP protocol makes it difficult to reliably identify the originator of an IP packet. Even in the absence of any deliberate attempt to disguise a packet's origin, widespread packet forwarding techniques such as NAT and encapsulation may obscure the packet's true source. Techniques have been developed to determine the source of large packet flows, but, to date, no system has been presented to track individual packets in an efficient, scalable fashion. We present a hash-based technique for IP traceback that generates audit trails for traffic within the network, and can trace the origin of a single IP packet delivered by the network in the recent past. We demonstrate that the system is effective, space efficient (requiring approximately 0.5% of the link capacity per unit time in storage), and implementable in current or next-generation routing hardware. We present both analytic and simulation results showing the system's effectiveness.