Introduction to algorithms
IBM Systems Journal - Special issue on cryptology
Protection Against EEPROM Modification Attacks
ACISP '98 Proceedings of the Third Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Breaking Public Key Cryptosystems on Tamper Resistant Devices in the Presence of Transient Faults
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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The EEPROM modification attack was first described by Anderson and Kuhn in [3]. This simple and low-cost attack is very efficient against tamperproof devices carrying a secret key stored in EEPROM. Soon after the attack has been published, we proposed a protection scheme using cascaded m-permutations of hidden wires [8]. This cascaded m-permutation protection scheme uses an (m × n)-bit encoding for an n-bit key and for which the best known attack will take at most O(nm) probes to compromise the permutations of the hidden wires. However, it is observed that if a particular card (instead of the whole batch of cards) is to be compromised, the complexity can be greatly reduced, and in the best cases, it can even be reduced to linear time complexity. In this paper, we demonstrate how it can be done, and propose a revised m-permutation scheme that would close the loop-hole. It is also proved that the probability of breaking the revised scheme will be 1/2n-1 for a n-bit key.