The Security of Hidden Field Equations (HFE)

  • Authors:
  • Nicolas Courtois

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

We consider the basic version of the asymmetric cryptosystem HFE from Eurocrypt 96.We propose a notion of non-trivial equations as a tentative to account for a large class of attacks on one-way functions. We found equations that give experimental evidence that basic HFE can be broken in expected polynomial time for any constant degree d. It has been independently proven by Shamir and Kipnis [Crypto'99].We designed and implemented a series of new advanced attacks that are much more efficient that the Shamir-Kipnis attack. They are practical for HFE degree d 驴 24 and realistic up to d = 128. The 80-bit, 500$ Patarin's 1st challenge on HFE can be broken in about 262.Our attack is subexponential and requires n3/2 log d computations. The original Shamir-Kipnis attack was in at least nlog2 d. We show how to improve the Shamir-Kipnis attack, by using a better method of solving the involved algebraical problem MinRank. It becomes then in n3 log d+O(1). All attacks fail for modified versions of HFE: HFE- (Asiacrypt'98), vHFE (Eurocrypt'99), Quartz (RSA'2000) and even for Flash (RSA'2000).