The design and implementation of a log-structured file system
SOSP '91 Proceedings of the thirteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Checking the correctness of memories
SFCS '91 Proceedings of the 32nd annual symposium on Foundations of computer science
A cryptographic file system for UNIX
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software
ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Transaction Processing: Concepts and Techniques
Transaction Processing: Concepts and Techniques
Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Design and Implementation of a Transparent Cryptographic File System for UNIX
Proceedings of the FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Unifying File System Protection
Proceedings of the General Track: 2002 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Using a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor
FC '98 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Financial Cryptography
HOTOS '01 Proceedings of the Eighth Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems
How to build a trusted database system on untrusted storage
OSDI'00 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Symposium on Operating System Design & Implementation - Volume 4
Fast and secure distributed read-only file system
OSDI'00 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Symposium on Operating System Design & Implementation - Volume 4
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Challenges in embedded database system administration
WOES'99 Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Systems on Workshop on Embedded Systems
Cryptographic support for secure logs on untrusted machines
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing
ICS '03 Proceedings of the 17th annual international conference on Supercomputing
Caches and Hash Trees for Efficient Memory Integrity Verification
HPCA '03 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture
Specifying and Verifying Hardware for Tamper-Resistant Software
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Effective implementation of the cell broadband engine™ isolation loader
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
DRMFS: A file system layer for transparent access semantics of DRM-protected contents
Journal of Systems and Software
Enabling fairer digital rights management with trusted computing
ISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information Security
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Digital Rights Managements (DRM) systems often must manage persistent state, which includes protected content, an audit trail, content usage counts, certificates and decryption keys. Ideally, persistent state that has monetary value should be stored in a physically secure server. However, frequently the persistent state may need to be stored in a hostile environment. For example, for good performance and to support disconnected operation, recent audit records may be stored on a consumer device. The device's user may have an incentive to alter the audit trail and thus obtain content for free. In this paper we explain the need for persistent state in DRM systems, describe several methods for maintaining persistent state depending on the system requirements, and then focus on the the special case of protecting persistent state in hostile environments.