Insights and analyses of online auctions
Communications of the ACM
Electronic Commerce Research
Information Technology and Management
Winner's curse and parallel sales channels-Online auctions linked within e-tail websites
Information and Management
Exploring auction databases through interactive visualization
Decision Support Systems
C2C Versus B2C: A Comparison of the Winner's Curse in Two Types of Electronic Auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Journal of Management Information Systems
Applying experimental online auctions in marketing research for multi-channel firms
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Bidding strategies for real-life small loan auctions
Decision Support Systems
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Fairness and access control for mobile P2P auctions over MANETs
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
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We have recently seen a tremendous number of auctions conducted over the Internet. This form of electronic commerce is rapidly growing, and it is projected to account for 30% of all E-Commerce by 2002. Using actual bidding transaction data from 324 business-to-consumer online auctions, we analyze the bidders' arrival process during each auction. We find that most bidders like to sign on early in the auction; typically, 70% of the bidders sign on during the first half. Our statistical analysis reveals that the minimum initial bid is negatively correlated with the number of bidders per auction, while the number of units offered and the length of the auction are positively correlated with the number of bidders. We also present a model for estimating the expected price as a function of the number of bidders, the mean and variance of the private valuation distribution, and the number of units to be sold in the auction. Our analysis shows that increased dispersion in the bidders' values may either increase or decrease the auction price, depending on the bidders' overall arrival process, the length of the auction, and the number of units. We calculate the optimal auction length and show that an auction's profit is a unimodal function of its duration and the number of units. The paper also addresses several other economic tradeoffs that are relevant for the optimal design of Internet auctions.