Telecommunications network design algorithms
Telecommunications network design algorithms
Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pricing in computer networks: motivation, formulation, and example
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On the existence of equilibria in noncooperative optimal flow control
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Virtual path bandwidth allocation in multi-user networks
INFOCOM '95 Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communication Societies (Vol. 1)-Volume - Volume 1
Architecting noncooperative networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
The designer's perspective to atomic noncooperative networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Stability vs optimality tradeoff in game theoretic mechanisms for QoS provision
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Analysis of a static pricing scheme for priority services
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Network QoS games: stability vs optimality tradeoff
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA)
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In noncooperative networks, resources are shared among selfish users, which optimize their individual performance measure. We consider the generic and practically important case of atomic resource sharing, in which traffic bifurcation is not implemented, hence each user allocates its whole traffic to one of the network resources. We analyze topologies of parallel resources within a game-theoretic framework and establish several fundamental properties. We prove the existence of and convergence to a Nash equilibrium. For a broad class of residual capacity performance functions, an upper bound on the number of iterations till convergence is derived. An algorithm is presented for testing the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Sufficient conditions for achieving a feasible equilibrium are obtained. We consider extensions to general network topologies. In particular, we show that, for a class of throughput-oriented cost functions, existence of and convergence to a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed in all topologies. With these structural results at hand, we establish the foundations of a design and management methodology, that enables to operate such networks efficiently, in spite of the lack of cooperation among users and the restrictions imposed by atomic resource sharing.